

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 EA-06 IO-10 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SSO-00

NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 ERDA-05 AF-06 ARA-06 CIAE-00

DODE-00 PM-03 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NASA-01 NEA-10 NSAE-00

NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02 PA-01 PRS-01 OES-03 SS-15 SAJ-01

ERDE-00 /112 W

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FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5139

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 GENEVA 6218

DISTO

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, CCD

SUBJECT: CCD - NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE (NWFZ) STUDY

SUMMARY: TO ASSIST INTERAGENCY REVIEW OF NWFZ STUDY,  
US DEL OFFERS FOLLOWING BACKGROUND/ASSESSMENT, COVERING  
CURRENT STATUS OF REPORT, FORMAT, AND TREATMENT OF  
MAJOR ISSUES. FINAL DRAFTS OF CHAPTERS WILL BE FORWARDED  
FOR REVIEW WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS. END SUMMARY.

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1. EXPERTS' GROUP IS NOW COMPLETING DRAFT CHAPTERS OF

STUDY FOR GOVERNMENTAL REVIEW. AD REFERENDUM TEXT OF CHAPTER V (VERIFICATION AND CONTROL) IS COMPLETED AND BEING SENT TO DEPARTMENT SEPTEL. AD REFERENDUM TEXTS OF REMAINING CHAPTERS WILL BE TRANSMITTED TO DEPARTMENT AS SOON AS THEY ARE READY, WHICH IS NOW EXPECTED TO BE EVENING OF AUGUST 9. IN LIGHT OF PROPOSAL REPORTED GENEVA 6202, EXPERTS LIKELY TO BE ASKED TO SIGN OFF ON AUGUST 13 ON TRANSMITTING STUDY TO CCD, WHERE IT WILL BE REVIEWED BY COMMITTEE BEFORE BEING SENT FORMALLY TO UNGA.

2. REGARDING REQUIREMENT FOR RAPID GOVERNMENTAL REVIEW, THERE IS CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE FOR FORMAL EXPERTS' APPROVAL OF REPORT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO PERMIT CCD OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW STUDY. MOST EXPERTS HAVE INDICATED THEY WILL NOT NEED TO SEND AD REFERENDUM TEXT TO CAPITALS FOR REVIEW. A FEW, SUCH AS UK, HAVE SAID THEIR GOVS WOULD NEED ONLY TWENTY-FOUR HOURS. WE HAVE PROMISED TO TRY TO MEET AUGUST 13 DEADLINE, BUT HAVE GIVEN NO FIRM COMMITMENT.

3. "REVIEW" IN CCD IS DESIGNED TO GIVE DELEGATIONS, ESPECIALLY THOSE NOT REPRESENTED IN STUDY GROUP, OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS ON-THE-RECORD VIEWS OF NWFZ ISSUES AS WELL AS ON THE STUDY. ASSUMING WE WILL BE IN POSITION TO SIGN OFF ON STUDY, US DEL WOULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO PRESENT SUBSTANTIVE POSITIONS ON NWFZ MATTERS, ONLY TO STATE THAT STUDY ADEQUATELY IDENTIFIES AND CLARIFIES ISSUES AND ACCURATELY REFLECTS VARIETY OF VIEWS HELD BY EXPERTS. HOWEVER, IF WE CONSIDERED IT DESIRABLE TO DO SO, WE COULD GIVE SUBSTANTIVE EVALUATION OF REPORT, HIGHLIGHTING CERTAIN VIEWS AND FINDINGS OR MAKING INTERPRETATIVE STATEMENTS AS NEEDED. WE WOULD NOT EXPECT DETAILED DISCUSSION OF NWFZ ISSUES UNTIL UNGA DISARMAMENT DEBATE.

4. FORMAT. RECOGNIZING THE WIDELY DIVERGING VIEWS HELD BY EXPERTS ON CERTAIN ISSUES, THE GROUP DECIDED DURING SPRING SESSION TO ADOPT A FORMAT ALLOWING STATES TO MAKE SURE THEIR POSITIONS WERE ADEQUATELY COVERED  
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IN STUDY. THUS, WHILE EXPERTS WOULD STRIVE FOR CONSENSUS FORMULATIONS WHEREVER POSSIBLE, ISSUES ON WHICH FULL AGREEMENT COULD NOT BE REACHED WOULD BE HANDLED BY PRESENTING DIFFERING POINTS OF VIEW AND IDENTIFYING PROPONENTS OF THESE POSITIONS WITH SUCH TERMS AS "MANY EXPERTS," AND "OTHER EXPERTS," AND "A FEW EXPERTS."

5. WHILE SUCH A FORMAT PERMITS INCLUSION OF VIEWS WE FIND UNACCEPTABLE AND IS HARDLY AMENABLE TO DRAFTING OF TIGHT, COHERENT REPORT, WE NONETHELESS BELIEVE IT SUITS US OBJECTIVES REASONABLY WELL. BY DEMONSTRATING THAT MAJOR DIFFERENCES EXIST ON KEY ISSUES, STUDY, AS IT HAS DEVELOPED, UNDERCUTS ARGUMENT OF SEVERAL NWFZ PROPONENTS THAT CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF NWFZ ARRANGEMENTS (E.G., NON-USE ASSURANCES, PROHIBITIONS ON TRANSIT, SAFETY AREAS) ARE INDISPENSABLE. AMPLE STATEMENTS IN STUDY OF US AND ALLIED VIEWS ON NUMBER OF CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES SHOULD GIVE US BETTER BASIS AT UNGA AND ELSEWHERE TO DEAL WITH NWFZ PROPOSALS OR FEATURES OF PROPOSALS THAT WE MIGHT FIND UNACCEPTABLE.

6. STATEMENTS IN CURRENT DRAFTS TO THE EFFECT THAT REQUIREMENTS FOR EFFECTIVE NWFZ'S VARY FROM REGION TO REGION AND THAT NWFZ'S WOULD NOT BE FEASIBLE IN SOME REGIONS (AND IN SOME CASES WOULD BE LESS DESIRABLE THAN EXISTING MUTUAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS) SHOULD HELP COUNTERACT VIEW INCREASINGLY PROMOTED BY MANY NON-ALIGNED THAT NWFZ'S SHOULD BE PURSUED IN VIRTUALLY ALL REGIONS. OVERALL IMPRESSION CONVEYED BY STUDY, IN OUR VIEW, IS THAT, WHILE NWFZ'S REPRESENT A POTENTIAL USEFUL MEANS OF PROMOTING REGIONAL SECURITY AND NON-PROLIFERATION, THEIR FEASIBILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS DEPEND ON A VARIETY OF CONDITIONS WHICH ARE PRESENT IN VARYING DEGREES FROM REGION TO REGION. WE BELIEVE PRINCIPAL IMPACT OF STUDY, IN LIGHT OF PRESENTATION OF CONFLICTING VIEWS ON MANY KEY ISSUES AS WELL AS OF AREAS OF AGREEMENT ON OTHERS, WOULD BE TO PROMOTE A MORE REALISTIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE PRACTICAL POSSIBILITIES FOR ESTABLISHING ADDITIONAL NWFZ'S AND OF THEIR POTENTIAL UTILITY IN CONTRIBUTING

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TO NON-PROLIFERATION. PARAS 7-9 DISCUSS HOW SEVERAL KEY ISSUES ARE HANDLED IN STUDY.

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INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 EA-06 IO-10 ACDE-00 ISO-00 SSO-00

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 GENEVA 6218

DISTO

7. NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCES. STRONG NON-ALIGNED  
VIEW THAT SUCH ASSURANCES ARE ESSENTIAL TO EFFECTIVE-  
NESS OF NWFZ IS REFLECTED IN STUDY, BUT SO IS US  
POSITION THAT SUCH ASSURANCES MUST BE CONSIDERED  
CASE-BY-CASE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THEY WOULD  
STRENGTHEN REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. WHILE  
NO OTHER DELEGATION APPEARS TO SHARE FULLY US  
"CASE-BY-CASE" POSITION, WE HAVE NONETHELESS NOT BEEN  
ISOLATED ON SEVERAL NON-USE QUESTIONS. ONE REASON  
FOR THIS IS THAT, WHILE SOVIETS BELIEVE NON-USE  
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ESSENTIAL TO EFFECTIVE NWFZ, THEY DO NOT BELIEVE  
COMMITMENTS CAN BE MADE IN ADVANCE OF ACTUAL NWFZ  
NEGOTIATIONS, INCLUDING AT SOME STAGE NUCLEAR WEAPON  
STATES. ON THIS BASIS, SOVS HAVE JOINED US IN ARGUING  
THAT NON-USE ASSURANCES CANNOT BE REGARDED AS PRE-  
REQUISITES FOR NWFZS. IN ADDITION, CATEFORICAL  
ASSERTIONS BY NON-ALIGNED THAT NWFZ PARTIES HAVE

LEGAL RIGHT TO NON-USE ASSURANCES HAVE DRIVEN SOME DELS  
TOWARD OUR POSITION.

8. TRANSIT. WHILE STUDY REFLECTS NON-ALIGNED AND SOVIET BLOC VIEW THAT TRANSIT WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS THROUGH TERRITORIAL SEAS AND AIRSPACE SHOULD BE PROHIBITED BY NWFZ ARRANGEMENTS, IT GIVES EQUAL WEIGHT TO WESTERN POSITION THAT NWFZ SHOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH EXISTING RIGHTS OF STATES TO GRANT OR DENY TRANSIT PRIVILEGES.

9. HIGH SEAS AND SAFETY AREAS. WHILE STUDY INDICATES STRONG INTEREST BY NWFZ PROPONENTS IN EXTENDING NWFZ PROHIBITIONS TO PORTIONS OF HIGH SEAS, IT MAKES CLEAR THAT ZONAL STATES CANNOT IMPOSE A SPECIAL REGIME ON PORTIONS OF THE HIGH SEAS WITHOUT CONSENT OF EXTRA-ZONAL STATES. VIEW IS EXPRESSED THAT EXTRA-ZONAL STATES MIGHT "VOLUNTARILY" ABIDE BY SAFETY ZONE RESTRICTIONS, BUT THIS IS COUNTERED BY CLEAR STATEMENT THAT SUCH RESTRICTIONS MIGHT BE FOUND UNACCEPTABLE ON POLITICAL AND SECURITY, AS WELL AS LEGAL, GROUNDS.

10. PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS. "MANY EXPERTS" TOOK THE POSITION THAT NWFZ'S SHOULD PROHIBIT INDIGENOUS DEVELOPMENT OF ANY NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES AND THAT THE PROVISION OF PNE SERVICES TO ZONE PARTIES SHOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH PROCEDURES CONTAINED IN NPT ARTICLE V. HOWEVER, AT INSISTENCE OF INDIAN EXPERT, VIEW IS ALSO EXPRESSED THAT INDIGENOUS DEVELOPMENT OF PNES IS NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH CREATION OF NWFZ.

11. WHILE FORMAT OF STUDY THEORETICALLY PERMITS  
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FULL EXPRESSION OF DISSENTING VIEWS, DEPARTMENT IN REVIEWING DRAFTS SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT ATTEMPTS TO EXPAND TREATMENT OF OUR POSITIONS IN STUDY WOULD ENCOURAGE OTHERS TO EXPAND THEIR OWN, AND THAT ATTEMPTS TO REFINE FORMULATIONS SO AS TO MORE FAITHFULLY REFLECT US POSITIONS COULD CAUSE OTHERS WHO HAVE JOINED US IN A FORMULATION TO FALL OFF, THUS LEAVING US IN AN EXPOSED POSITION (E.G., "ONE EXPERT" HELD...). THEREFORE, IF FURTHER CHANGES IN TEXTS ARE DEEMED NECESSARY, DEL WOULD APPRECIATE LEEWAY IN SEEKING NEW FORMULATION THAT WOULD MEET OUR NEEDS WHILE AVOIDING THESE PITFALLS.ABRAMS

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## Message Attributes

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**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** REPORTS, POLICIES, NUCLEAR FREE ZONES, NUCLEAR WEAPONS  
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**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 08 AUG 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** GarlanWA  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
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**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
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**Disposition Remarks:**  
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**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
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**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** GarlanWA  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 07 APR 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <07 APR 2003 by lzenbel0>; APPROVED <14 JUL 2003 by GarlanWA>  
**Review Markings:**  

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
06 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** CCD - NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE (NWFZ) STUDY SUMMARY: TO ASSIST INTERAGENCY REVIEW OF NWFZ STUDY  
**TAGS:** PARM, CCD  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006